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But with new content being created all the time. With the brilliant Professor James Rogers at the helm this week, his podcast is the provocatively named Cheese Eating Surrender Monkeys. Questionmark. You'll remember that the expression Eating Surrender Monkeys was coined by The Simpsons in 1995 as a pejorative for the French James. I just talked to Professor Olivier Schmidt, who is a professor of political science at the Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and they talked through the many complex narratives of the French performance in the Second World War.

Don't forget, in the supposedly easy advance that the German army made to the coast and the defeat of France in 1940, the French lost 100000 troops in battle. It was a bloody summer for them. If you like this podcast, please go and read it. Share, view all that nonsense. Wherever you get your iPods, check out the World Wars. And don't forget everyone go and check out the history at shop. For all those hard to buy, history obsessed aunties and uncles, you know, they're out there.

Go to the history shop and send them some historical historical gifts. In the meantime, over to James Rogers. Enjoy.

Hi, only thanks for coming on the World Wars. How are you doing today? I'm great, thanks, James. So where are we talking to you from?

I'm currently in Paris, in the building of the campus of the Militaire, because I'm currently detached from is due to the community where I'm currently the head of research and studies at the Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies, which is probably for your British audience, the French equivalent to the Royal College of Defence Studies. So basically we train colonials and civilian equivalents to the highest strategic functions. So I'm currently in Paris. Wow.

So you're sitting at the heart of French military thinking in the French capital, which sounds to me like, well, there's no better place to talk about French memories of the Second World War. So let's jump right in. Let's jump into that period at the beginning of the war, the fall of France, because it was pretty rapid, wasn't it, six weeks in total from May to June 1940. What happened?

Well, I think a good starting point to try to understand what happened is to discuss how we remember how it happened. And basically, you have two memories of how it happened. The first one is really the school epitomized by the French historian Mark Block, which wrote this book, The Strange Defeat, basically a few months after the fall of France and was himself a resistent, was arrested by the Gestapo in 1944 and killed. But he's one of the founding father of French Story School and he's a very respected figure.

And in this trench defeats Mark Block basically argues that it's an entire collapse of the elites, that the Third Republic selected a political and military personnel that was so influenced by personal gains that it lost a view of the collective goods.

Therefore, it is understanding French society was almost up for grabs in the sense that an external push, such as a military defeat, tested the resistance of the system and the system just collapsed. And his interpretation has been extremely powerful because it gave meaning to this very surprising military defeats in 1939. Nobody, and especially not the Germans, but neither British nor the Americans, and least of all the French, expect such a quick military defeat.

So there is a kind of need for understanding of why the countries that was deemed to be the most powerful military power in Europe up until 1939, winner of World War One, all of a sudden collapses. And Knoblock provided that meaning. Basically, the fruit was rotten because of a treason from the elites. A second type of interpretation is especially prevalent in the English speaking world. It's the cheese eating surrender monkeys rights. Basically, the French armed forces did not fight and it leads to all the jokes that we all know about the French tanks that have six gears, one forward, five backward and so on and so forth.

And I've been very impressed by Tony Judd's in his memoirs. So he used to write book reviews for The New York Times and he wrote something about the fall of France. And it reminds the readers that during those six weeks meets every campaign, France lost 100000 soldiers. So they vote. And what's even more interesting is that after I wrote the review, you received a number of letters from well-intentioned people and educated people because, you know, it's New York Review of Books type of readership write it received several letters asking, are you sure you get the right figure?

Because 100000 people sounds like a lot. And it is. But because this notion of cheese eating surrender monkeys has been so prevalent in the English speaking world, even educated readers were surprised by the figure. So it's a second type of memory from World War Two, which is basically France did not fight and collapsed because it did not fight, while obviously it was not the case. And basically, I think the answer right now, especially if you look at the more contemporary historiography, has been a combination of better preparation on the German side and basically better military leadership, combined with a bit of luck that happened in a military campaign which explains poor generalship on the French side, combined with better generalship and a bit of luck on the German side, explained the collapse.

I mean, the. Is absolutely shocking, 100000 dead in six weeks, and you can understand why people did take a second glance and think it's not really the figure who isn't the dominant historiography at all. But let's jump back to that period to 1940 and think how did people like General Charles de Gaulle react when they found out that, well, France had been militarily defeated so decisively and so quickly and at such a heavy cost?

Yeah. So there is this great quote in the war memoirs by Charles de Gaulle that he published in 1954. And as a small inside here, he was always very frustrated that Churchill received the Nobel Prize in literature for his memoirs, which he did not write well. The girl wrote his own memoirs and never received the prize for it. And considering the history of, let's say, rocky relationship between the goal and Churchill, it was always a thorny issue for him, I'll put it that way.

But in his memoirs, if we are to believe his memoirs, he has this great sentence recalling his reaction to the defeat and to the cease fire, saying this is too stupid. The war is off to a terrible start, but it has to continue. And basically very early on, the goal is one of the few decision makers which have a an understanding that basically what happened was losing a battle, but it was not a war. And even when de Gaulle decides to go to London and to try to continue the fights, he has this notion that the U.S. has not joined the fight yet as the U.S. is already the arsenal of democracies.

When they will come, things will change because it has only been the first moment. But in 1940, Duggal is nobody is like a brigadier general. It's like no one compared with Philip Patton, who was Marshall, who was the winner of Veldon. So in French memory was of course, idolized.

Peyton was also the one who put an end to the mutiny in 1917 by improving the well-being of soldiers that were on the Western Front against Germany. So he was an idolized figure. Dougal is No. One, so that's the girl's first reaction. So on June 16th, there is in the Gouldian mythology this moment when he speaks at the BBC and makes his famous speech, basically saying the war is not over. Please join me if you can. But nobody listens to him because you have thousands of French people on the streets trying to move away from the German agents.

So in 1940, the main reaction from the goal is to say it's not over, but Dougal has to build a movement around him. Some of the French elites are totally stunned by the decisiveness of the campaign, and we're absolutely not expecting that and have this sense of rallying not under the flag, but under martial, Peter, because he appears as a savior, which Peter, of course, utilizes to push forward his own conservative agenda. Well, reactionary ideological agenda, which will be the Vichy regime.

And you'll have the millions of French people in 1940 who basically wait to see what happens. It's the main reactions and the main challenge for de Gaulle for the next two to three years will be to establish himself as the legitimate authority, speaking on behalf of France. And that will lead to many, many difficult discussions with both the UK and the US.

So go on and on it. Give us some insight. How does de Gaulle manage to achieve that?

Because is is pushy, I will put it that way, is very pushy. And it has a two pronged strategy. The first one is to make himself indispensable in London. So becoming the main interlocutor with the UK. And quite frankly, he has a very high opinion of himself, a bit like Churchill. Right. This is probably why they love hated each other. They are very similar in that regard.

And when you read what the growth rate, it has this really sense of almost saying, I am friends, I embody the states in the nation. So the way he does it is by becoming indispensable in London, becoming the main interlocutor and by building his own forces, especially in the French Empire. And so that will become what is called the free French. Right. And those who decide to join the goal. And that will be difficult building the free French movement.

That will be difficult because there has been the cease fire and some important parts of the French armed forces, they are legitimised. So there has been a ceasefire, there is a functioning or barely functioning state, which is the Vichy regime, and you have like three stars, four star generals, admirals. Why will they join a two stars, all one star in the French system to star is one star in the British system. So a brigadier is just off Earth.

Why will they decide to join this unknown person? And building its support in the French Empire is difficult. And there has been some moments when basically the free French vote against the legitimate army that was still responding to orders from Vichy. And the main change happens in 1942 because in 1942, when the allies start the campaign in North Africa, it changes the calculus for a number of the armed forces that were still responding to Vichy orders. But it's not before 1942 that things start to change.

And it's really epitomized by those who have participated in the battle of biohacking and those who have not became basically happens a few weeks before El Alamein. And it's important for the French mythology because basically it's four thousand French people will have to hold off 40000 Italian German troops so that the British can act through your retreats and have a new defensive position in El Alamein and basically to do it by holding off so German forces for three days, which allows the British to actually retreat and regroup and eventually win at El Alamein.

But to think that because of the disparity in forces 4000 against 40000, it has become mythologized among the free French, you know, as those who fought at El Alamein. And it's a moment when General LeClaire says we will never stop until the French flag flies again. On Strassberg is helpful to have been freed from Germany. So Birak for the free French is really important. And in 1943 are those who have fought in El Alamein and those who have not, and who have joined the goal only after 1942.

And there is a parade in Tunis in 1943 during which the free French or the former free French who had fought alongside the British they parade with the British forces and the French forces were still legitimate and responded to Vichy empathy's in 1942 is actually parade alongside the US. So it's not an amalgamated French forces. The difference between the free French and the regular army who only joined after 42, it takes time to create something which is totally unified and it creates also different sensitivities because of free French.

And they have been fighting with the British alongside the British. And for them it's the main inspiration. Is our brother in arms. The others, they have been fighting mostly alongside the Americans. So it creates this kind of dichotomy between the two forces.

You're listening to the World Wars podcast on Dunston's history. Here's more from James Rogers and his guest after this.

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But then is there also a memory that comes from those who lived through that prolonged occupation?

So it's actually the difficulty about the memories of World War Two in France. It's very different from World War One, because all soldiers in World War One had a relatively similar experience. They fought in the trenches and it created the sense of unity of experience. Right, so they could relate to each other.

World War Two is extremely different in that regard, because you had the free French were very early on joined de Gaulle and eventually participated in operations in North Africa, in France and Germany. You had the regular army who only joined Duggal after 1942. And so this had a relatively different experience from the conflict.

You had also, and it's a very unique experience in French squadron, were fought alongside the USSR, the Normandy in Yemen squadron basically were French pilots who were operating under Soviet command. France is the only Western country that literally floats not at the same time, but directly under Soviet command during World War Two because of the small squadron. So just on the side of those who fought against Germany directly in conventional operations, you have a multiplicity of memories. Right?

Then there are those who fought in the resistance who were in France fighting against the invasion, against the occupation and who are not professional soldiers. Most of them were not professional soldiers at all. So they have a memory and an experience of World War Two, which is shaped by, OK, we had all the secret networks. We had to gather the materials that was parachuted by London and basically the experience of being in the resistance, which itself was organized alongside different movements based on political affiliations.

You had the communist, you had the monarchists, you had the republicans. So all those were not unified, politically speaking. So the memories of a resistance are themselves segregated along side political lines. And on top of that, you have those who actually actively collaborated with Germany because it happened as well.

And you had a number of French people who willingly joined the SS in the Standard Divison and Charlemagne, for example, and they were also French. But of course, after World War Two, their memory was only glorified by far right members. Right. But all this creates a multiplicity of memories of World War Two. What's kind of interesting is the way the collective memory of World War Two and of the occupation evolved over time because between 1945 and basically the 1970s, the dominant memory was resistance.

So there was this notion that basically everyone was a resistance, more or less. And those who were working for the Vichy regime, it's because they really did not have a choice. And in 1970, there has been a shift in the historiography, especially pushed by a book by an American historian called Robert Paxton, who wrote a book on France. And it basically shows that Vichy, far from implementing German orders because of coercion, was actually actively collaborating and preempting German wishes, going beyond German wishes in terms of finding Jews, for example, to send to Germany.

So it shifted the memory which evolved from we were all resistant to we were all complicit in the occupation. And around the 2000s, I will say that the memory has not stabilized, but it had found a new balance and is now embracing the complexity of experiences, basically saying, yes, some people actually collaborated. Some people actually were in the resistance in the middle. There was a lot of people trying to get by and trying to survive.

And so we are moving beyond the almost Manichean narrative of we are all on the good side, we are all resistance on the inside or we were on the bad side, we were all collaborating. Now, I think there is a balance that is gradually being found in terms of how collective memory is remembering the occupation, how it's being taught in high school, for example, how it's portrayed in exhibitions or documentaries and so on and so forth.

I'm going to add another perspective in that, because we had Thomas Battalia on the show a few weeks ago and Cameron Zizou both who have spoken about how the French Empire was involved in the liberation of the metropolitan France as well. It wasn't just Algeria and France itself that was really responsible for freeing the country from its occupation. But you had those from North Africa and West Africa who took to the beaches on Operation Dragoon and in many other battles as well. How did this event of the French Empire coming to the rescue of metropolitan France impact the relationship between France and its empire?

So there are two ways in which it impacted the relationship. The first one is in terms of strategic lessons learned, so to speak, and the second one is in patterns of interactions between colonialists and colonized people. In terms of strategic lessons learned, the main lessons learned, what that friends survived because the empire provided strategic depth and it was from the empire that we could draw resources and basically to regroup and to participate in the multiple battles and campaigns for the liberation of France.

Because, as you know, there was simultaneously the campaign following D-Day and also the campaign coming from the Mediterranean up north. So basically west, east and south north that eventually regrouped in all of us.

So it's basically created the sense that the empire was fundamental and critical in permitting to provide the strategic depth. And it's shaped the relationship between France and the colonies after World War Two in the sense that decolonizing was difficult to accept by French elites because it was perceived as losing what was providing a source of strength and a source of resilience for France, which also explains, you know, the terms of philosophy that emerged after sub-Saharan Africa was decolonized because France recreated the strategic depth, trying to draw on resources and draw on patrons of political connections that were seen as a source of power, basically.

So that was a main strategic lessons that the empire provided strategic depth and France as relatively small territory, but with global ambitions needed to have the strategic depth that the empire provided. And the way we maintained the strategic depth was by recreating privileged, I will say, relationships with the former colonies. The second lesson was basically in terms of more socio political interactions, that it took quite a while to acknowledge the contribution from colonial troops to the liberation of France.

It's not until recently that, for example, Senegalese troops that participated in the different campaigns were granted the benefits from the combatant status. Right. So it took quite a while to acknowledge this contribution. And I think it has really been during the past 20 years that in terms of collective memory, we remember more and more the contribution from colonial troops. So as a movie in 2006 called Andriesen, which basically follows a platoon of North African soldiers landing near Marseilles and then going up until Alsace, but it was the first time that it was actually portrayed and a different number of bills and laws have been adopted that acknowledged and facilitated the providing of resources for foreign fighters.

There's so many narratives, so many memories, so many experiences that combine here. But they also must have left the nation divided. How does a country like France recover socially and politically after the war?

After the war, as a social and political recovery was based on the myth because we recreated a myth of we were all resistant and the goal was a savior that was fighting for France all along. And of course, it was facilitated by the fact that while de Gaulle was very much involved in French political life after World War Two. So by creating this myth of we were victims, we were never an accomplice of Nazi Germany, it facilitated a kind of new national unity that would have been much more difficult to create otherwise.

It was also facilitated by the fact that the Cold War started. We can date the. The official beginning of the Cold War between 1947 and 1949, somewhere along that time, France was initially reluctant in having to choose a side, so to speak, because just after World War Two, the main threat for France, as it was perceived, was Germany. We wanted to make sure that Germany will not become a major power again. So having to choose a side between the Soviet Union and the US was not the immediate concern for French policymakers.

But already in 1947, 1948, clearly French policymakers have to position themselves and be the minister of foreign affairs at the time is instrumental in shaping NATO. And what's interesting is that Beddoe was adamant in trying to have an automatic defense clause in NATO. They wanted to have an automaticity in terms of if one country was attacked automatically, Zelizer had to come to their defense, which is not the case, as we know, because U.S. pushed back against it.

And we ended up with Article five, which is all measures as deemed necessary by the specific countries. Right. But France was really pushing for and automaticity in the defense clause, which it did not get. And that kind of started a narrative or at least an understanding of NATO that it's a useful tool for French defense, but it's an incomplete tool because we can, in the end, never entirely trust the US security guarantee. Therefore, we will have to develop our own tool of defense, nuclear deterrence and so on.

We never believed in U.S. extended deterrence. We benefited from it, but we never believed in it.

And that feeling that in the end we can ultimately never trust an alliance is very much shaped by the memories of World War Two, because there was a sense, rightly or wrongly, but there was a sense that the British ally had left France fighting alone against Germany first in 1936 by allowing and not backing up France. When Hitler made his first push in terms of basically taking over all the provinces, there was a sense that the UK did not like France up and therefore France was abandoned.

And there was also the sense that in 1940, the French armed forces sacrificed themselves so that the UK called FLI at Dunkirk. So the memory of Dunkirk for the French armed forces is that Zuka fled and we fought so that they could fight another day. So this is also why Christopher Nolan's movie, when it was released, I think two years ago, does not portray the French armed forces at all or not at all in the movie. It's an entire British centric narrative.

It was not really well received in France because of that reason, basically saying, well, you know, they could leave because we vote for them and then they forget about us. So it plays into all the traditional narratives of perfidious Albion. In the end, we cannot trust the Brits and so on and so forth. So, of course, several centuries of prejudices and cliches that come into play. But it's interesting how they are reinterpreted and how they take on a new life based on new events.

So to wrap up, there was this notion that ultimately it's nice to have allies, but we cannot fully trust them. It's also deeply shaped by World War Two.

Ollie, you are a pro. You're an expert. Thank you for taking us so masterfully through these so many complex narratives of the French Second World War experience, which I think really help us dispel some of these longstanding and perhaps outdated myths about the French and the Second World War, although I think the British and French rivalry won't be disappearing any time soon. Where can people read more of your work and what's coming next?

So basically, if people are interested in this topic, this discussion is based on a chapter that I wrote called Beyond the French Defeat, French Defence Policy and the Memories of World War Two, which should be released sometime in 2021 in a collective volume edited by Dr Matthias Asheton, called The Long Shadow of World War Two, which basically looks at the memories of World War Two and their impact on defence policy in a number of countries, including France, Germany, Russia, Japan, the U.S..

So it's a really nice collection of how memories actually shape policy. And if people want to read more about this topic, I also recommend Julian Jackson's wonderful biography of Charles de Gaulle. It is a brilliant biography which really masters the interaction between Diggles personal life, the overall political context, and how Duggal has become a myth in French. Life, so I would really recommend that one. It's a long book, but it's a great read. Well, there you go.

The long shadow of World War Two. You heard it here first. Go out and buy it. Ali, thank you so much for coming on the show.

My pleasure. Thank you for having me. Did you find in the history of our country. Hardbody, just a quick message at the end of this podcast, I'm currently sheltering in a small, windswept building on a piece of rock in the Bristol Channel called Lundie. I'm here to make a podcast. I'm here enduring weather that frankly is apocalyptic because I want to get some great podcast material. You guys, in return, a little tiny favor to ask if you could go to wherever you get your podcasts, if you could give it a five star rating, if you could share it, if you could give it a review.

I really appreciate that. From the comfort of your own homes, you'll be doing me a massive favor. Then more people listen to the podcast. We can do more and more ambitious things and I can spend more of my time getting pummeled. Thank you.

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