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Scottish teens who are making bets maybe they have stopped now to trade GameSpot, GameStop, GameStop, I'm sorry, there is a website called Game Spot, so it's extremely confusing.


Hello and welcome to the five 30 Politics podcast. I'm Galen Drac.


I'm Nate Silver and this is Talk Talk.


All right. This is our Long Lost Post Georgia model episode. As listeners well know, the real end of the 2020 election, those double Senate runoffs in Georgia were eclipsed by the attack on the Capitol.


And we've been covering the fallout of that ever since. So today we're going to take the opportunity to look back on what happened in those two elections. We'll also try to set some expectations for the electoral environment of the next two years. That's a large part going to be dictating how lawmakers behave. And by the way, related to that, we launched our approval rating tracker for President Biden today, which you can go check out on the website. He begins at 54 percent approve.


Thirty five percent disapprove.


But before we get to any of that, I have to ask you, did you manage to sell off all of your GameStop stock before it crashed today?


You know, I should be like in the core fascination point for this story. I've been kind of not paying as much attention as I should, but, yeah, I did not get in on the GameStop bubble.


We're not going to spend too much time on this. But what is your 90 second take on the takeaway from the GameStop debacle? I mean, L'Oréal efficient market hypothesis.


I don't know my takeaways. I wanted five. I want a five minute covid vaccine. Daylon, I've been waiting, waiting a long time for both of those. If you could only have one, which one would it be?


The vaccine? I mean, come on. Yeah, I'm kidding, but, you know. Yeah. All right. So let's get to the matter at hand. As much fun as the GameStop story has been. So in the end, Raphael Warnock beat Kelly Loffler by two points. John Asaph beat David Perdue by one point two points. This all seems like years ago at this point.


But from a nuts and bolts perspective, why did Warnock and Asaph win those two elections?


It does feel like it was much longer ago that it was. I think they won because Georgia is increasingly purple and for a variety of reasons, including the conduct of Trump and Republican elected officials. After the November election, Democratic voters were more motivated to turn out. So a higher percentage of Democrats, especially black Democrats, turned out again in January after having turned out in November when you had two races that were very close before. That's enough to basically tip the balance here.


David Perdue actually won the plurality of votes against John USCIRF in November and wound up losing by OSF by a point or so, one point two points to be exact, in January. So you had about a a three point swing, and that's mostly, it looks like to me, turnout driven. So I think when we talked a little bit after Georgia, this is kind of more like the Stacey Abrams thesis of Georgia, where we can get voters to turn out more than they can.


And if our voters turnouts were just purple enough where we can start to win some races. So I think that's more or less what happened.


So how do we bridge the takeaways from the general election in Georgia and the runoff election in Georgia? Because during the actual November presidential election, it seems like those upscale suburban areas flipping votes towards Joe Biden from having voted for Republicans in large part contributed to Biden's win because there was high turnout across the board, whereas in the runoff it really was unequal levels of turnout. Turnout amongst Republicans was quite high, but turnout in largely black precincts was even higher. So what does that tell us about the Democratic coalition going forward?


I mean, is one a clear model for success? Can you combine the two? Where does that leave us? I mean, I think inevitably Democrats would have to mix and match a little bit. I kind of look at from the GOP point of view more, I suppose, where like the thing that's scary for the GOP is if you have a certain voter low engagement voter who's only going to turn out if Donald Trump himself is on the ballot and yet you don't gain back anything with like a suburban swing voter just because Trump is off the ballot.


I mean, one prior that I had was that Joe Biden won the election, although the fact that Trump was not acknowledging that Joe Biden won the election is a big asterisk. But Joe Biden won the election so you couldn't have a certain suburban swing voter who's like, well, I didn't like Trump, but I also like lower taxes. And so I'm going. Make sure David Perdue stays in office so Democrats can't raise my taxes and that type of voter.


Apparently there weren't that many of that type of voter, but they were maybe just as many voters who said, well, I have to give Joe Biden a chance to enact his agenda because I think Joe Biden was pretty moderate and reasonable maybe.


Do people even think that deeply about it? Do most people just say, like, hey, I'm going to vote for the Democrat or, hey, I'm going to vote for the Republican? Like, do voters strategize on the way that you're describing?


98 percent of voters don't think like this, but the two percent make the difference in this race. All right. I mean, there's a fair amount of evidence of tactical voting to kind of preserve divided government traditionally. Right. It's one reason for the midterm penalty that a party typically suffers. Maybe there's less of that. Now, bipartisanship is something which is functionally very, very difficult in the United States. But maybe if you want gridlock, then that's part of the benefit of it.


You know what I mean? If you like the status quo on fiscal policy but you don't like Donald Trump, then you would be kind of irrational to want Republicans to control the Congress. Still, keep in mind, I know it seems like an incredibly obvious point, but keep in mind, Georgia was before the capital insurrection, right? I don't know what would have happened if you held it afterwards. I think actually my guess is Democrats would have won by more, given that Republicans now have a new wrinkle of being maybe a somewhat dangerous political party.


There have been, by the way, in some states, small numbers of voters, but interesting numbers who have switched over from Republican registration to Democratic or other since the Capitol Hill riot insurrection. Now, what we decide to call it to revolt. And, you know, that might indicate people there, a certain type of voter who's kind of getting off the GOP train. And those are probably more the higher income, higher socioeconomic status, maybe living in mixed race communities type of voter that would be coming in in Georgia, for example.


All right. So there's a broader conversation here about where the Republican Party goes from here and what kind of coalition Democrats can keep together when they are the party in power and no longer have some of the benefits of being opposition. We're going to get much deeper into all of that in regular podcasts. But I want to dig into some of the numbers here.


So all told, how did the polls do in Georgia in the runoffs?


So our final polling average had we're not winning by two point one points and he won by, I believe, two point one point two points, if you read carefully, two point one gallon. If you round, if you round more precise. All right. All right. There you go. I'll give it to you and I'll give it to you.


USCIRF was by one point eight million by one point to. So between the two races, you have a zero point three Pollinger on average. It's really, really good.


So I have layers of questions here. First of all, we talked on this podcast about the fact that the applause rated name brand pollsters that we think of, like Monmouth or New York Times Upshot or The Washington Post, ABC News, etc. Those pollsters were not in the field in Georgia before the runoffs. There were a lot more experimental and lesser known pollsters out there polling the public.


Does this mean that those lesser known, more experimental pollsters that we have, someone considered to be lower quality pollsters are on to something?


I mean, there's a mix of different types of polls that poll Georgia, including a couple of traditional polls that were partisan polls. But, yeah, it's mostly an eclectic bunch, shall we say. Are they on to something? Maybe. Are the other polls broken? Maybe. Is there an element of two wrongs? Make a right? Maybe. I mean, maybe if there are some things. I mean, I just wish from a data standpoint that we had had Monmouthshire, Quinnipiac or someone polled Georgia just kind of as a comparison, would they have come in with.


Asaph plus five, is that a plus one or plus two or not? I don't know without having that comparison point. I mean, there's no live color nonpartisan poll. I don't think of George either. So, like I said, call color partisan polls and there's some lots and lots of online and Simsim and whatever else. But it's just very hard to answer that question. I think one thing to notice up front is that in the elections, in the Trump era.


In which Donald Trump was not on the ballot, the polls did pretty darn well, meaning twenty eighteen midterms, this Georgia runoff, the Virginia gubernatorial election into twenty seventeen various special elections like the Doug Jones race, you know, some were a little stronger, but in general, that was a pretty strong set of races for the polls. So maybe there is something about like Trump in particular that was causing problems for certain types of polls.


And what would that thing be in particular like? What are hypotheses about why? When Trump's not on the ballot, polls are fine when Trump is on the ballot. There's something that pollsters can't capture, that there are low propensity voters who do not ordinarily vote and are hard to reach on the phone and or have low social trust maybe. So they're not inclined to, like, take a poll of their hard reach in the first place for the most important problem.


Or maybe they're being screened out by likely voter screens, by the polls and more sophisticated likely voter screens. And so therefore, you have some missing Trump voters maybe, which is different than Scheidt Trump voters saying that they're necessarily going to deceive you about their intent and they're hard to reach on the phone. And they have demographic characteristics that go beyond just like education and are hard to wait your way out of it. So why did some of the more eclectic polls seem to have fewer problems?


I mean, you'd have to go on a case by case basis. I think there are some of them that are doing different things that are smart. I think there are some of them that may have gotten a bit lucky. For example, if you call people on landlines or automated polls, those tend to produce samples that are older and more rural, usually not people, you know, to white. So that could be a case of like two wrongs making a right, potentially some of the more online oriented firms.


Maybe they have better ways to reach people. Actually, response rates are higher in online polls, although it's not a random sample. It's hard to have a random sample, but like a hypothetical that you do get in your panel when they're participating. So I know, again, these questions are all twice as hard to answer without the point of comparison of not having the traditional mammoth, the upshot or whomever. CNN having polled Georgia.


One other point on this that's worth bringing up is that the polls were actually quite good in Georgia in November.


And so is another element here that Georgia is easier to poll. Are there any hypotheses for why?


I actually don't know. I think we haven't really totally unpacked why the polls were quite bad in some states and quite good and others. And furthermore, why these patterns seem to be somewhat persistent, because ordinarily you think that pollsters would and historically they do correctly like what we missed in the state or that state a couple of times in a row. So let's really look under the hood here. But I don't think we have great answers to that. Some of the states where the polling was most off in November are states that had higher incidences of covid spread at the time of the election.


The theory being that Democrats being more inclined to listen to public health officials were more in the mood to stay at home. You stay at home, you're bored. In a pandemic, you answer phone calls more often.


Georgia had a worse covid situation during the runoffs than it did in the run up to the presidential election.


Well, so Georgia had times had big problems with covid. Georgia actually did not have much covid, relatively speaking, in like late October. It was doing fairly well. It had more in Georgia in December or January. So you would think the polls might get worse there, if that's the reason why. But they did, if anything, a little better, obviously, in the runoff. And so that theory doesn't kind of neatly explain things as much.


One question I have here, this is stepping quite a bit back when we talked in the past about why it's easier to pull, for example, the United States than maybe the UK is that there is just clear demarcations between demographic lines, demographic groups. And so you can basically figure out that if you're X, Y, the type of person who lives here who has this racial or ethnic background, who has this educational profile, who is this gender that you have a much better sense of how they will end up voting.


And so because Georgia is you can look and say, OK, it's 30 percent black, it's at this percent white educated, this percent white, non college educated, whereas a state like Wisconsin, it's more homogenous and you can't really get at large chunks of the population by just breaking down by demographic groups.


Does that potentially make it easier to poll in Georgia? Yes, for sure, because you can almost infer what 90 percent people are going to do just based on their information in the voter file in Georgia.


Also has information on voters race because it's covered by the Voting Rights Act is the reason they collect that data and other states don't. So you have more precise data. And it's not like a state where you have like you have this in many states. But black Democrats in Georgia are very Democratic. Right? It's not like a state where you have some upswell of conservative Republican African-American voters. So, yeah, that helps a lot. The more crisp the demographic splits are, then the more you can almost read the polls like a model where your Pryors basically can make things easier for sure.


OK, so we've gotten into the nitty gritty of the data in Georgia.


How much does this change our understanding of the twenty twenty election after it's all said and done? Right. The narrative after the November election was like, wow, Biden barely eked it out. It wasn't exactly a. Creation of Trump just because Republicans beat expectations and the House and held on to a lot of seats in the Senate, and so it was kind of a mixed message, does this change much about how the twenty twenty election gets written about in history books?


I think it both will and should. I always thought the notion that like of a kind of a split verdict was a little over baked in the first place. I mean, not that many elected incumbents lose. Trump lost about their vote by four and half points. He lost Georgia. He lost Arizona. He lost Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan by big margins.


But although by like forty five thousand votes in three states.


But yeah, well, Petrovka elected by narrow margins in the first place without winning the popular vote. But no, it certainly changes things, especially because, like, again, my prior would have been that Republicans would gain ground in the runoffs because they behave a little bit like like midterm's. You want balance usually if a party wins and it's not as kind of hungry. And the fact that things actually shifted in this Perdue race from Perdue winning the plurality to losing at a three point shift away from the GOP before, again, the capital mob riot.


I mean, that suggests that there are electoral consequences to Trump's contesting the election. Maybe that results in lower turnout, you know, in the GOP, oddly, because it was overshadowed by the Capitol Hill revolt. I'll keep using different synonyms here. I think that kind of lesson almost got ignored, that you tell all your voters that, hey, this shit is rigged. Well, most of them are taking it literally, but some of them will.


And that's the problem for the GOP.


What is that the thing that's driving the lower turnout, or is it simply that Trump's not on the ballot because Trump was telling voters that the election was rigged before the November election, too? But when he was on the ballot, those lower propensity voters seem to have turned out.


I don't know. I mean, the problem is we have like one data point year all kind of really determine because we don't really know. We're entering like 12 different questions with this one data point. So we can't do any to kind of throw up our hands and say, I don't know. It's almost like if you say this election was stolen and rigged, they're not going to count your ballots. It seems obvious that some people will maybe not turn out as a result.


So that's kind of my prior and certainly directionally matches what happened. It's not the only explanation, but like it could be both. Yeah, but it's obvious enough that, like, yeah, it's a story that makes sense for sure. You know, I know The New York Times, they had a couple of stories in Georgia with the daily podcast which are worth listening to if you're thinking about this. And they had when they went around to rallies, they had trouble having finding people at rallies.


They would say, oh, yeah, well, I'm not going to turn out. But if you go to a rally, then some selected sample. Right. And some notion that like, well, I'm going to turn out, of course, but I feel like maybe my friend of a friend is not going to turn out or something else. I don't know. I mean, maybe there are more detailed ways to get at that. But like, I know it would make me a little bit nervous if I were Republicans.


So to that point, more specifically, and this is something that we'll cover for the coming two years so we don't have to dig into it that much right here, right now. But considering this may be our last model, talk for a while. Let's talk a little bit about where this leaves the two parties for twenty twenty. And again, because it will shape lawmaker behavior between now and then, it's already shaping lawmaker behavior.


So the current number of seats in the House is a little unclear because of one lawmaker's death. And then also endless election in upstate New York district that has still not had its results determined. But Republicans probably need to win only six seats in the House to take control of that chamber and one seat in the Senate. Should our starting expectation be that Republicans will control Congress in twenty twenty two?


No, I don't think so. I mean, I think. The expectation should be that it's highly competitive and that the GOP has, you know, maybe it's 50 50. I mean, let's check in with our old friends, Scottish teens and see what they think.


OK, what are the Scottish teams think? Scottish teens who are making bets, maybe they they've stopped now to trade GameSpot, but stop GameStop.


I'm sorry. There is like a website called GameSpot. So it's extremely confusing. 53 percent chance Democrats retain control of the Senate. Forty three percent says that Democrats controlled the House, so basically tossups. That seems reasonable enough to me. It may seem counterintuitive. The Democrats have better chances in the Senate, in the House, but they actually have a somewhat decent map in the Senate where, of course, only one third of seats are in play, whereas in the House they probably lose a handful of seats because of redistricting that would wipe out the small edge they have.


But no, look, I mean, I think Georgia ought to be a little bit of a wake up call to our primaries and assume that a typical midterm backlash there very well could be. But like I think the events of one six linger in people's minds. It like I mean, certainly so for one thing, I don't think you're going to have the drop off in Democratic turnout that you would ordinarily expect when your president is in charge, because I think Democrats will remain very wary that, to be blunt, that if Republicans control the Senate in twenty twenty four or the House, then they'll try to steal the election.


That's why I think Democrats, we can debate whether Democrats are right to worry about that or not. But like, I think that's a different type of issue, that democracy itself is kind of on the ballot here. And I know I mean, you can compare a little bit to after September 11th or after Watergate, they're not perfect analogies, but those are cases where the midterms were affected by events in the previous couple of years.


So that's kind of a bet that the fights of the last three months will continue for the next two years.


Well, and there and there's some other stuff, too, here. The GOP is going to have a lot of conflict between Republicans and anti Trump Republicans right now claiming that maybe it's authoritarians and not authoritarians. So that could lead to them nominating some suboptimal candidates like I think a moderate, for example, candidate in Ohio where Rob Portman retired would win going away if Jim Jordan gets the nomination. I think it's a more competitive race potentially in Ohio. Also, like if you look at the timing of the economic recovery, we're probably going to have we have to have probably a talk about covid again on an upcoming regular podcast.


Then if things go somewhat to the textbook, then by summer, certainly by fall, there's a much greater degree of normalcy in people's lives. People who want the vaccine can get it. Things start to come back. The economy will also rebound by the time we get to twenty, twenty two, maybe things feel actually close to normal, normal and not partially normal. Right when the economy is rebounding again from this kind of difficult period. And Joe Biden starting out with decent approval ratings, although they're actually not that high by historic standards.


But he's more popular than Trump ever was. I mean, there's a scenario here where Biden has a wind at his back for the first two years of his term.


All right. Well, we've covered a good amount of ground here. So let's move on to some listener questions before we wrap things up. So we got a number of questions, both relating to the elections in Georgia and the overall state of politics in the country. Looking ahead to twenty, twenty two and beyond.


Let's go through a number of them. The first one comes from Joseph and he asks, Now that we have another election of data under our belts, will the model be much more bearish on Democratic chances in future presidential and or statewide races in Ohio and Iowa? And perhaps what Joseph is getting at is. The kind of like fundamentals model of the overall partisanship of this state is X, and so we should just expect that statewide elections much more clearly aligned with X, regardless of what the polls say.


Is that the case?


Yeah, I mean, there's a couple of questions embedded in this. Like one is if you mean the model as it is. And yes, Ohio and Iowa now with more years of data, there's no longer going to be, for example, some 20 twenty. I have to remind myself now in twenty twenty, you're looking at twenty sixteen and twenty twelve data, including twenty twelve where Obama actually won Ohio and Iowa. Seems crazy now. Right. But he did so in twenty twenty four.


Then you no longer have that last gasp of Obama strength in the Midwest and it's purely Trump data basically. And so yes, that would make the prior in Ohio and Iowa less eager to call them purple states anymore. Is that a question of like after twenty twenty if you rely more on fundamentals as opposed to polls in general, that's something that we're a year away from having to assess, I think. What are your early thoughts?


My early thoughts are that people generally are inclined to over fight the last war. Look, I mean, part of it is we are relying on polls to. Adjust if polls are wrong in the same direction, there should be lots of financial and reputational and other pressures for them to not be wrong again. I mean, the question is, is there like a long term decline in the quality of polling is, I think, a pretty frickin tricky one.


And for us to have to answer that before you can answer whether or not you're going to put more stock in fundamentals.


I mean, our midterms model actually puts quite a bit of stock in fundamentals already. So it might not need as much changing as like in some of these races where like the polls, you know, our poll, for example, had Susan Collins, our model as just a tiny underdog in Maine, even though she was a bigger underdog in the polls. The fundamentals weighed pretty heavily on that race, for example, where the model never got too carried away with like Jenny Harrison in South Carolina.


So the midterm model is. I think probably it's fairly fundamental as it is. I think it's probably in pretty decent shape the I mean, less work for you and twenty twenty two.


Yeah, maybe we'll do some basketball or baseball stuff, but like, yeah, no, I think the Matear model is and it performed we think really pretty well in the Senate races this year, again, because it was like catching a fair bit. The Presidential Medal is almost philosophically designed to kind of dial the fundamentals down to zero. By the time you get to Election Day, I'll put it like this. I am happy that we have a midterm before the presidential year.


That will help us to diagnose is there something fundamentally wrong with polling or was it something specific to Trump was in the specific circumstances of twenty twenty and a pandemic and maybe different circumstances in twenty sixteen? Because the reasons for polling here weren't necessarily the same. I'm happy we have a somewhat lower stakes. And as far as pollsters go, reputational, a very high stakes for the country. Midterm coming up in twenty twenty two where we have a model that we think is already pretty well equipped to take polling was something of a grain of salt and then face, frankly, really difficult decisions in twenty, twenty four.


But that will be an important data point to look at.


Are any of us going to be doing this in twenty twenty four? Do we really have another presidential. So we have to cover.


And we'll also have the question of like how much do we think we're actually having a democratic léocadie election in twenty twenty four? I don't mean to sound alarmist, but maybe things accelerate instead of decelerating. So Joy, Joy, Joy, Gailen, Joy.


OK, next question. Let's get back up here from Nick. He asks, what are the worst model misses? In other words, the differences between predicted margin and actual margin.


He's asking us to call ourselves out.


Imagine that they're on the House side, not the Senate side, because the Senate there weren't like in a huge upset, but I haven't looked at it yet. We will. We will, though.


That actually gets another question here. The question is, the presidential and Senate models seem to have done pretty well, but the House model wasn't as accurate. Any ideas? What was up with that?


Not really. I mean, our house estimate was actually like a little bit more bearish on Democrats and some of the competition. I mean, I know I mean, a lot of these district polls just weren't very good. And you can update the Pryors, which we need to in the House of some races. But I think it probably is going to really be the case in a lot of these House races at the prior or the fundamentals will have done better than the blended version of like fundamentals plus polls.


We'll we'll look at that. I mean, if the polling is not good, then then our model is going to have trouble in races where it's putting a lot of weight on the polls. It's pretty simple and straightforward.


What are those? Next question is the empirical arguments that can be made that Georgia will keep moving left or shift back to the right?


I've taken a lot of time trying to predict, like, is it predictable in which direction states move? And the answer is not really, although it may be in particular, if you look at migration patterns, more and more Georgians are born outside of the state. So maybe it would shift. Perry wrote about this recently. There are also states where, like there is a view that, hey, North Carolina, it's going to be a purple state now permanently or even trending blue.


Right. And it hasn't quite done that. And we have tried to model these things statistically. You don't really get very far. So if anyone has any creative ideas and like predicting in which direction states go, then let me know.


I mean, one question that I have to that point or suggestion or idea is basically what are states that have booming cities? Right. If the trends that are happening in Atlanta continue that, I think you would expect to see the political realignment in that state continue North Carolina, while it has a growing research triangle and Charlotte and so on, and it doesn't have a booming metropolis. And again, with Virginia. Right. Like D.C. has been booming. And same with, for example, Phoenix, Arizona.


So, like, if those areas basically have the majority of the population in the state and the trends of continuing to grow as a city and become more diverse and have more of an educated workforce continue, is that a good proxy for where the state is headed?


I mean, I'm also thinking about the pandemic and how that might affect migration patterns. Kind of at first there was this notion that, oh, a lot of people are going to move out of big cities. And it turns out actually, well, there are just so many kovács rural areas that won't stop covid. Right. But I think they're going to be things that are shaken up by increased ability to work from home or people who relocate temporarily and decide might as well do it permanently and so forth.


And that could maybe affect mid-sized metros. More than big metros is one theory. Also, I think some dislocation from California in particular.


All the billionaires are moving to Miami, billionaires moving to Miami.


But I'm not as concerned about the billionaires so much as companies that no longer require their employees to be in California or move their headquarters. That could affect tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of jobs potentially. I mean, that could be material potentially some of these Sunbelt states, if they're kind of lower tax jurisdictions and are attracting kind of knowledge sector workers, I mean, that seems like it could possibly affect things a little bit.


All right. So a little conjecture there. Let's answer one more question before we go. And it is another Georgia based question. It is, why did we not do better than Asaph?


David Perdue is an elected incumbent. They tend to have. To relations for their constituents. Lefler, I think, ran very far to her right in the general election. She said, I'm more conservative than Attila the Hun. I think that might have hurt her. She's kind of saying I'm not a moderate anymore. She was seen as maybe a little bit more trumpet's. If you had an election where Democrats really benefited from high turnout among black voters and more is black, maybe very few voters who were really excited about him and felt more lukewarm on Asaph.


I mean, it wasn't a big gap, but like maybe those weren't like ads were more effective. His candidacy is more historic in some ways, though, although Jarosław is also kind of a pretty unique story, too. I think it's circularize tautologically, a slightly stronger candidate than USCIRF. And maybe Lefler was a slightly weaker candidate than Purdue, but that's a tautology. All right. Well, let's leave it there. Do you have any parting thoughts?


This might be our last model talk for a while.


Kind of is Alectown. That we don't have any until I take that back, that we're not going to have we can have, we can have, we can chat whenever you want, we just won't really have a model to work off of.


It's been a long time, so I didn't either have a model or an election hanging over my head because like dating back to like twenty nineteen, we were working on Raptorex, the new NBA metric. We are working on the primary model, which took a ton of time. We wound up doing a lot of work on the general election model. We wound up doing some work, actually not that much on the congressional model. Then we have the election itself.


And so for two years, I had something hanging over my head now. Now you don't. Right.


And so it's like, what's the meaning of life when you don't have a forecast model to work on and then you have epidemics, you have lots of time to sit at home and contemplate what is the meaning of life?


What conclusion did you come to? I haven't figured it out yet. Again, I want my Madrona or my Fizer around five and then I'll feel a little bit more. I'll take Johnson and Johnson. I think it will get approved soon. It sounds like. Take some of that. Yeah. No, it's weird. It's a weird. I'm very privileged and spoiled, but it's a weird adjustment to make. And in some ways the fact that you had this crazy election made me notice that in my class because I don't get to have much of a life election in election year anyway.


So he noticed the disruption from normal a little bit more.


Yeah, well, as I mentioned before on this podcast, I am looking forward to getting back to the office. It's been too long. Yeah, but let's leave it there. So thank you. Thank you. My name is Gaylan. Tony Chow is in the virtual control room. Claire Biriyani Curtis is on audio editing. You get in touch by emailing us at podcasts at five thirty eight dotcom. You can also, of course, tweet us with any questions or comments.


If you're a fan of the show, leave us a rating or review in the Apple podcast store. Actually, do it. Go. You know, there was a five star rating. Tell Nate that you appreciated his three years of forecast modeling or just tell someone about us. Anyway, thanks for listening and we will see you soon.